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CASENOTES
UNITED STATES V. GRAYSON

QUESTIONABLE SUPPORT FOR
BROAD JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION

When considering the subject of sentencing, it is necessary
to begin with a recognition of its primacy in the criminal justice
system. The majority of persons who are formally charged with
a criminal offense plead guilty.' As a result, they by-pass the
trial proceedings and are therefore immediately faced with the
imposition of a sentence. Thus, the sentencing process becomes
the defendant's single most important contact with the judicial
system. In addition to the majority who do plead guilty, a few
plead not guilty and thus stand trial.2 The majority of these persons, however, are convicted and eventually must face a judge
for sentencing.
Early common law jurists emphasized the judicial philosophy of retribution accomplished by a system of fixed penalties
for all crimesA Because punishment was fixed, the sentencing
procedure became a mere formality. The modern philosophy of
sentencing, however, operates on the premise that punishment
should "fit the offender and not merely the crime."14 The modern
goal, therefore, is that the perceived probability of the reforma1. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967). See also
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 n. 2 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (in 1964 90.2% of federal convictions were based on guilty pleas); ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 1 (Approved Draft 1968); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT

TRIAL 3 (1966) (the precise data is difficult to establish but the figure is approximately 90%).
2. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 264 n. 2.
3. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 376 (J. Wendell ed. 1847); Comment, The Admissibility of CharacterEvidence in Determing Sentence, 9 U.
CHI. L. REV. 715 n.1 (1942) (The death penalty was imposed for at least 160
different crimes. Indeed, variations in punishment according to the severity
of the crime were only found in the manner in which the death sentence
was imposed).
4. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978), quoting Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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tion and rehabilitation of the offender 5 determines the length of
a sentence. Out of this approach there has developed a system
of indeterminate sentencing. 6 Under this system, the sentencing judge, loosely governed by broad legislatively imposed minimum and maximum penalties, 7 determines the degree of
punishment necessary for the reformation of the offender. 8 Emphasis is placed on individual treatment of the accused. 9 Thus,
length of sentence is no longer automatic, but is a result of broad
5. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 41, quoting 337 U.S. at 248.

6. By the 19th century, the theory of indeterminate sentencing had developed in the United States, replacing the retribution oriented philosophy
of early English common law. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 133 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIs]. Penal reform in the United States, with em-

phasis on the use of the indeterminate sentence and parole, stemmed from

the "Cincinnati Declaration: of the first meeting of the American Prison Association and was put into practice at the Elmira reformatory in New York
in 1870." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 519 (1973); cf. H.
BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY: THE AMERICAN

CRIME PROBLEM 488, 834 (1st ed. 143) (as early as 1787 Benjamin Rush
stated that the indeterminate sentencing theory was used in the 1820's in
houses of refuge for minors).
The Supreme Court, in important dictum found in Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, gave legitimacy to the indeterminate sentencing movement:
Today's philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example between first and repeated offenders. Indeterminate
sentences the ultimate termination of which are sometimes decided by
non-judicial agencies have to a large extent taken the place of the old
rigidly fixed punishments. The practice of probation which relies heavily on non-judicial implementation has been accepted as a wise policy
....
Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals of criminal jurisprudence.
Id. at 248.
7. In the federal system, for example, second degree murder is punishable by imprisonment "for any term of years or for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1111
(1977). Rape is punished by "death or imprisonment for any term of years
or for life." Id. at § 2031 (1977). Kidnapping is punishable by death, imprisonment for life or any term of years. Id. at § 1201 (1977).
8. The sentencing judge is obligated to make his decision on the basis
of predictions regarding the convicted defendant's potential, or lack of potential, for rehabilitation. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 247. The basic
premise of the indeterminate sentence is the relatively modern concept
that individualized rehabilitation is the paramount goal of sentencing. M.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 87 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as FRANKEL]. Accord, SHIMM, FOREWARD, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRB. 399

(1958) (sentencing must look to the offender's rehabilitation, to his restoration as a functioning, productive, responsible member of the community).
9. In Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932), a district court judge,
through his discretionary power, revoked a defendant's probation privileges. The revocation was based on the judge's belief that the defendant
was lying concerning his unexplained absences. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, and the judge's power to individualize each case,
through careful, humane and comprehensive consideration of the particular
offender. Id. at 220.

19791

Judicial Discretion

discretion on the part of the sentencing judge. 10
"Indeterminate sentencing under the rehabilitation model
presents the sentencing judge with a serious practical problem:
how rationally to make the required character analysis so as to
avoid capricious and arbitrary sentences [which the indeterminate sentence places] within the realm of possibility."" One solution is to provide the judge with as much information as is
reasonably practical concerning every aspect of the defendant's
life. 12 Included should be information concerning the person's
character, propensities, present purposes and criminal tendencies. 13 In most jurisdictions, probation officers conduct a
presentence investigation of the defendant's life and provide
such information. On the basis of that information a presentence report is used to aid the judge in sentencing. 14 The judge,
however, may consider information beyond the report and may
also, on his own, conduct a broad inquiry concerning the defendant. This independent investigation is largely unlimited either
as to the kind of information the judge may consider, or, as to
15
the source from which it may come.
10. See generally F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 134
(1964); Cohen, Sentencing, Probationand the RehabilitativeIdeal: The View
from Mempa v. Ray, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to
McGautha, 49 TEX. L. REV. 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Pugh & Carver].
11. United States v. Grayson, 348 U.S. at 48.
12. Id., quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250. The federal statute provides:
Use of information in sentencing
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1977).
The court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, dispense with the
presentence report. E.g., United States v. Schwenke, 221 F.2d 356, 358 (2nd
Cir. 1955) (by proceeding to impose sentence without the report, the judge
simply exercised his discretionary power to dispense with it).
13. United States v. Grayson, 348 U.S. at 48, quoting Pennsylvania ex.
rel. Sullivan v. Arbe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
14. E.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). The defendant was convicted of murder, and the jury advised the court to impose a life sentence.
But the judge, relying in part on the presentence report, imposed the death
sentence. The case was remanded by the Supreme Court, not because of
the judge's reliance on the presentence report, but his failure in a capital
offense case to disclose all portions of the report he used in determining
sentence; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (judge considered
presentence report in affirming revocation of plaintiff's parole); Gregg v.
United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969) (the judge was allowed to read the
presentence report even before jury returned verdict); Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. at 246-47 (judge increased defendant's sentence based on
criminal record revealed in presentence report).
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2), 18 U.S.C.A. provides:
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Under the guise of a scheme attempting to fit a proposed
sentence to a particular offender, the sentencing judge in reality
has full discretion to take whatever action he deems appropriate
in each case. 16 There are no specific guidelines with which to
instruct the sentencing judge in his decision. 17 Thus, the judge
The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior
criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his
behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other
information as may be required by the Court.
Accord, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1971) (in the sentencing
proceeding the district judge conducted an inquiry into the defendant's
background and gave explicit attention to the three previous felony convictions the defendant had acknowledged).
The sentencing judge may even take into account uncharged criminal
acts. E.g., Davenport v. United States, 411 U.S. 919 (1973) (pending indictments); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 244 (arrests); United States v.
Marines, 535 F.2d 552, 554-55 (10th Cir. 1976) (dismissed charges); United
States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118-20 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant's involvement
in large scale drug dealing); United States v. Card, 519 F.2d 309, 314 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1975) (charges that have ended in acquittal); United States v. Atkins,
480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973) (charges that have been revised on approval); Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1970), reaffirmed
on rehearing,437 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971) (defendant's failure to appear for sentencing); United States v. Cifarelli, 401
F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968) (no conviction).
The courts have also found it essential to consider facts concerning the
defendant's character. E.g., United States v. Dent, 477 F.2d 447, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (defendant's malicious behavior); United States v. Carden, 428
F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1970) (age, health and family situation); United
States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959
(1970) (past life and habits). See United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965) (the aim of the sentencing judge is
to acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and the history of
the man before it).
The courts are not to consider facts deemed unconstitutional. North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (harsher sentence because defendant
indicated his intention to appeal conviction); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d
138, vacated and remanded, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (where it is argued that due
to the lack of defined sentencing standards in capital cases, race has played
an important unconstitutional role in sentence determinations); Verdugo v.
United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971)
(giving defendant a harsher sentence on the basis of evidence seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights); United States v. Mitchell, 392 F.2d
214 (2d Cir. 1968) (Defendant claimed his sentence was increased because
he was an agnostic. However, the trial judge said he did not rely on this
consideration and therefore the appellate court sustained the sentence).
Moreover, the judge's investigation of the offender is not confined by
the narrow limits of trial court rules. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at
250.
16. See gener'ally F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1964); DAVIS,'supra note 6, at 133-41; Note, ProceduralDue Process at Judicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARv. L. REV. 821, 841 (1968).
17. There is, however, a limited amount of case law that acts as guidelines. See note 15 supra.
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develops a dependence on various informational sources. 18 A
major area of controversy concerning these sources surrounds
the question whether a judge may consider the demeanor of the
accused observed during the trial. 19 More specifically, in fixing
the sentence of a defendant within statutory limits, may the
judge consider the defendant's alleged false testimony observed
during the trial?
In 1917, the Fourth Circuit determined that in fixing a defendant's sentence, a sentencing judge could rely on his personal belief that the accused had committed perjury. 20 The
majority of the circuits have similarly held. 21 However, not until
18. Id.

19. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241.
20. Peterson v. United States, 246 F. 118 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246

U.S. 661 (1918). Defendant was convicted of stealing a rubber stamp worth
40 cents from a post office. The judge took into consideration his belief that
the defendant had committed perjury in maintaining his innocence, and
gave the defendant a three year sentence in prison.
21. Eight circuits have allowed the judge the right to weigh perjury in
his sentencing decision. E.g., United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.
1976) (The judge stopped defendant's testimony, sent jury out of room, and
explained perjury laws to defendant. Defendant thereafter changed his testimony. Trial judge then considered his belief that defendant committed
perjury in his sentence determination); United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d
1233, 1235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1974) (district court judge
stated, "I feel I added about two years for perjury during the trial in my
sentence"); Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1974) (judge stated
he did not believe defendant's story of having received his injury by a fall in
the bathroom, rather than the result of a gun shot, and considered such
testimony in sentencing); United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir.
1973) (FBI agent testified that though defendant agreed to answer questions, he failed to provide details of his story when interrogation got more
specific. The court determined that this did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, and the district court did not err in deciding
to increase defendant's sentence because of his breach of this promise);
United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972) (The defendant contended that the judge abused his sentencing discretion by considering his
suspicion of perjury. The appellate court stated that as long as the sentence
fell within the statutory limits they would not disturb it); United States v.
Wallace, 418 F.2d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 955 (1970)
(The jury decided that the defendant warranted only probation. However,
the judge imposed a sentence because the defendant denied the charges
both at the trial and sentencing hearing. Stated the court, "an inescapable
demonstration of the defendant's perjury is a factor the judge may be derelict in ignoring"); United States v. Levine, 372 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1967) (The
court was faced with the contention that the trial judge had abused his discretion in giving maximum sentence because he relied on the defendant's
exercise of his right to take the stand. The judge stated: "I have made up
my mind on this matter and indicated it before that this defendant took the
stand, denied complicity all the way through, and in my judgment committed perjury before the court. I cannot see any grounds for leniency at
all. . . ." Id. at 74 n.4. The appellate court said that the sentencing judge's
comments only indicated that he believed the defendant committed perjury
while testifying, and he may consider that factor in imposing the sentence);
Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1951) (appellate court held
that the sentencing judge had acted properly in considering the character of
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United States v. Grayson22 did the Supreme Court deal specifically with the right of a judge to consider, in sentencing, his personal belief that the defendant had lied in court.
FACTS AND FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURTS

Ted Grayson escaped from a federal prison camp, but was
apprehended and indicted for prison escape in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 751(a). 23 At trial, Grayson admitted leaving camp, stating that he did so out of fear.24 However, the government's rebuttal evidence and cross-examination on crucial aspects of his
story contradicted Grayson's testimony. 25 The jury returned a
the defendant as reflected in his own perjury and his inducement of another's perjury at the trial in determining what sentence to impose). Cf
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 268-69 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (case remanded
for resentencing. A trial judge may not impose further punishment because
he disbelieves the defendant).
22. 438 U.S. 41.
23. Id. The federal statute provides in part:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorfacility in which he is confined by direcney General or from any ...
issued under the laws of the United
tion of the Attorney General ...
[may] be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisStates by any court ...
oned not more than five years or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976).
24. "I had just been threatened with a large stick with a nail protruding
through it, by an inmate that was serving time at Allenwood, and I was
scared, and I just ran." Grayson stated that the threats had been made in
the presence of many inmates by one prisoner, Barnes, who sought to enforce collection of a gambling debt and followed other threats and physical
assaults made for the same purpose. 438 U.S. at 42.
25. For example, Grayson testified that after crossing the prison fence
he left his prison jacket at the side of the road. On recross, he stated that he
also left his prison shirt but not his trousers. Government testimony
showed that on the morning after the escape, a shirt marked with Grayson's
number, a jacket and a pair of prison trousers were found outside a hole in
the prison fence. Id. at 43. It should be noted that in defendant's brief to
the Supreme Court, it is stated that the trousers that were found were khaki
work trousers which could not be identified as belonging to Grayson. Also,
the pants, along with other articles were found on Penn Hill, an area well
known as a drop-off point for contraband coming in and out of the prison
camp. The khaki work pants which were found in the area were of the type
worn by inmates on most of the work details, but Grayson was in the kitchen detail, and they wore white pants. Brief for Appellee at 4, Grayson v.
United States, 438 U.S. 41 (1978). On cross examination Grayson also testified: "I do believe that I phrased the rhetorical question to Captain Kurd,
who was in charge of the [prison], and I think I said. something if an inmate
he do. First of all he
was being threatened by somebody, what would ...
said he would want to know who it was." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S.
at 43.
On further cross examination, however, Grayson modified his previous
recollection. Captain Kurd testified that Grayson had never mentioned in
any way threats from other inmates. Finally, the alleged assailant, Barnes,
by then no longer an inmate, testified that Grayson had never owed him
money and that he had never threatened or physically assaulted Grayson.
Id. at 43.

19791
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verdict of guilty. 26 At the sentencing hearing the district court
judge stated, that because he believed Grayson's story was a
percomplete fabrication, he would consider in sentencing, his
27
sonal belief that Grayson had lied on the witness stand.
On appeal, 28 Grayson argued that the judge had erred by
imposing a sentence, "the severity of which was based in part
upon the judge's belief that the defendant had committed per30
jury during trial. '2 9 The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction,
but upon rehearing reversed in accordance with its previous decision in Poteet v. Fauver.31 "Poteet mandates that no additional
26.

United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 105 (3rd Cir. 1976).

27. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated:
I'm going to give my reasons for sentencing in this case with clarity,
because one of the reasons may well be considered by a Court of Appeals to be impermissible; and although I could come into this Court
Room and sentence this Defendant to a five-year prison term without
any explanation at all, I think it is fair that I give the reasons so that if
the Court of Appeals feels that one of the reasons which I am about to
enunciate is an improper consideration for a trial judge, then the Court
will be in a position to reverse this court and send the case back for
resentencing. In my view a prison sentence is indicated, and the sentence that the Court is going to impose is to deter you, Mr. Grayson, and
others who are similarily situated. Secondly, it is my view that your
defense was a complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever. Ifeel it is properfor me to considerthatfact in the sentencing,and
I will do so.
Id. at 104-5 (emphasis added).
The court could, with no explanation, sentence Grayson to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by statute, that is, a five-year prison
term. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1978); Dorsynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); Government of Virgin Islands v. Richardson,
498 F.2d 892, 894 (3rd Cir. 1974).
28. Grayson advanced three contentions in his direct appeal to the appellate court. The first was that the district court had erred in failing to ask
his voir dire question: "Would you be more likely to find the defendant
guilty merely because he has previously been convicted of a crime?" His
second claim was that the court had erred in permitting the introduction of
evidence of his prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. Without explanation, both of these contentions were found to have no
merit. Grayson's third contention was, as presented in the text, that the
judge had erred by imposing a sentence, "the severity of which was based
in part upon the judge's belief that the defendant had committed perjury
during trial." United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d at 105 n.3.
29. Id. at 105.
30. United States v. Grayson, 542 F.2d 1168 (3rd Cir. 1976) (affd without
opinion).
31. 517 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1975). In Poteet, a defendant's prison sentence
was augmented because he persisted in maintaining his innocence after the
jury had returned a guilty verdict, even though there was no charge of perjury or conviction for that crime. The defendant claimed he was denied due
process. "A defendant has a right to defend himself, and although he is not
privileged to commit perjury, the sentencing judge may not add a penalty
because he believes the defendant lied." Id. at 395. The appellate court in
Poteet gave two reasons for its decision: 1) One cannot be punished except
upon a charge and opportunity for a hearing giving due process and 2) the
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penalty may be imposed upon a defendant because the trial
judge believes that the defendant lied while testifying. Here,
Grayson's sentence was unquestionably increased for just this
reason. His sentence, therefore, cannot stand. '32 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the cir33
cuits on this issue.
GRA YSON IN THE SUPREME COURT

In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's decision. 34 Grayson reaffirmed that a sentencing judge, in fixing the sentence of a defendant within statutory limits, may consider the defendant's
35
false testimony observed by the judge during the trial.
The majority's decision emphasized the need, directly resulting from the nature of indeterminate sentencing, for all sentencing judges to have sufficient information concerning the
36
character of the offender and his potential for rehabilitation.
The demeanor of the accused during trial, especially his willingness to perjure himself in court, was deemed sufficiently probative of his prospects for rehabilitation. 37 Thus, the judge had the
legal right, and now the personal duty, to consider such testi3
mony. 8
defendant's right to defend is burdened if he understands that, if convicted,

his mere denial of the charge under oath will lead to successive convictions
of perjury. Id. Cf. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d at 109 (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting). Judge Rosenn did not think Poteet was applicable to Grayson.
Poteet involved an effort by a state trial judge at sentencing to coerce a con-

fession from the defendant under the threat of imposing a longer sentence.
A close reading of the case shows that it was for that reason the court was
critical of the sentencing judge.
32. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d at 105. The appellate court determined that the trial judge could not be allowed to weigh respondent's testi-

mony in fixing a suitable sentence, even after finding it to be a "complete
fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever," because to do so would

penalize defendant for exercising his right, would violate due process by
punishing him for perjury without notice of the charge or opportunity to be
heard, or could deter other criminal defendants from taking the witness
stand by placing an unfair burden on their right to testify. Id. at 103.
33. United States v. Grayson, 434 U.S. 816 (1977). One circuit has di-

rectly rejected the probative value of the defendant's false testimony in his
own defense. Scott v. United States, 418 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits
follow policy set by Grayson. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45 n.3.
34. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 41.

35. Id. at 55.
36. Id. at 50. See notes 41-63 and accompanying text infra.
37. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 50. See notes 41-49 and accompanying text infra.
38. See generally United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41.

19791
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ANALYSIS

The defendant set forth two arguments in order to affirm the
appellate court's decision and relieve the sentencing judge of his
right to consider alleged false testimony. First, he argued that
the district court's sentence constituted punishment for the
crime of perjury for which he had not been indicted. 39 Second,
the defendant alleged that by permitting the consideration of
perjury, the Court would "chill" the defendant's right to testify
on his own behalf and would also inhibit his right to testify
40
truthfully.
Alleged Perjury as a Relevant Sentencing Factor
Before addressing the defendant's arguments, the Court
noted that in order to insure that the sentencing process would
not become a "game of chance," 4 1 the use of a wide range of information concerning the defendant's character was justified.
Information about the individual aids the judge in assessing the
offender's potential for rehabilitation. Thus,42 most factors leading to such a determination are acceptable.
The Grayson Court supported this conclusion by recognizing that challenges levied against the constitutionality of broad
judicial discretion in sentencing, 43 have led to a broader acknowledgement that a sentencing judge may consider information beyond the presentence report. 44 Such information
includes evidence heard during trial and the demeanor of the
39. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
40. Id.
41. Id. See United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d at 1236 where it is stated:
The effort to appraise "character" is to be sure, a parlous one, and
not necessarily an enterprise for which judges are notably
equipped by prior training. Yet it is in our existing scheme of sentencing one clue to the rational exercise of discretion. If the notion
of "repentence" is out of fashion today, the fact remains that a manipulative defiance of the law is not a cheerful datum for the prognosis a sentencing judge undertakes. . . .Impressions about an
individual being sentenced - the likelihood that he will transgress
no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to
assist with a lawful future career, the degree to which he does not
deem himself at war with his society - are, for better or worse,
central factors to be appraised under our theory of "individualized"
sentencing. The theory has its critics. While it lasts, however, a
fact like the defendant's readiness to lie under oath before the
judge who will sentence him would seem to be among the more precise and concrete of the available indicia.
42. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
43. See note 15 supra.
44. See note 12 supra.
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accused. 45 Eight circuits have held that a defendant's demeanor, exemplified by his truthfulness while testifying on his
own behalf, indicates his attitude toward society and his prospects for rehabilitation and, therefore, is relevant to sentenc46
ing.
Grayson emphasized the Court's belief in "the freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil."'47 A defendant's
readiness to lie under oath evidences his ability to make such a
choice. 48 Such evidence, stated the Court, "may be deemed pro'4 9
bative of his prospects for rehabilitation.
In those instances where a trial judge believes that the defendant has committed perjury, he may justify the imposition of
a heavier sentence on the grounds that one's willingness to perjure reflects upon his ability to be rehabilitated. 50 The increased
sentence allows more time for the defendant's reformation,
which his perjury shows to be needed. 5 1 Even though eight circuits and the Grayson Court have recognized the validity of this
theory, if the major justification supporting it proves to be
45. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING To SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRO§ 5.1 at 232 (1971).
46. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45 n.3. See note 20 supra.
47. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52, quoting Morrisette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (defendant lacked the intent to steal bomb casings from the government, and thus never was faced with having to choose
between good and evil). See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937) (Judge Cardozo emphasized the assumption of freedom of the will as
a "working hypothesis in the solution of [legal] problems"); Blocker v.
CEDURES,

United States, 288 F.2d 853, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring) (the
law must proceed on the scientifically unprovable assumption that human
beings make choices in the regulation of their conduct and that they are
influenced by society's standards as well as personal standards); Fisher v.
United States, 149 F.2d 28, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ("In the determination of guilt,
age old conceptions of individual moral responsibility cannot be abandoned
without creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines the whole administration of criminal law").
48. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
49. Id.
50. Some judges, speaking either for the majority or in dissent, have rejected the contention that they have the power to impose a second sentence
for the substantive offense as a justification for increasing a sentence based
on suspected perjury. See, e.g;, United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d at 1288
(Craven, J., concurring). Although the appellate court approved of the district judge's consideration of defendant's false testimony under oath, Judge
Craven felt that Peterson should be overruled. Allowing a trial judge to impose a harsher sentence upon the defendant because he believes the defendant lied on the stand will destroy the defendant's right to testify on his
own behalf. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d at 269 (trial judge in determining
sentence, took into consideration his belief that because defendant continued to assert his innocence, he must have committed perjury. On appeal,
the use of this practice was rejected and sentence reversed).
51. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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slightly weak and unreliable, indeterminate increases in
sentences cannot be justified.52 Both case law and commentators have criticized the assumptions used to support the justification. 53 The Court, however, largely ignored these attacks, and
instead placed its reliance on several tenuous assumptions.
The first of these assumptions the Court relied upon was
that of the "ability and duty of the normal individual to choose"
between good and evil. 54 This contention ignores the awesome
and peculiar pressures placed on a defendant during trial.55 For
example, a guilty person may choose to maintain his innocence,
not from any lack of remorse, but as a consequence of his terror
of incarceration. 56 Similarly, a defendant's false testimony may
57
simply reflect his attempt to avoid loss of community 3tanding.
Neither of these situations conclusively proves that the defendant's character resists rehabilitation. Despite this fact, the assumption that those who perjure themselves require a longer
period forrehabilitation may be inappropriately applied to these
defendants.
When a defendant pleads not guilty and is found guilty, the
assumption generally drawn is that the defendant must have
perjured himself. 58 In comparison, the defendant who pleads
52. See note 136 infra.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d at 1288 (Craven, J., concurring) (judge's discretion in alleged perjury "chills" defendant's right to testify); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d at 269 (judge may not consider alleged
perjury). See generally FRANKEL, supra note 8; Carroll, DiscretionaryPenalty Increases on the Basis of Suspected Perjury, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 677 [hereinafter cited as Carroll]; Drew, Judicial Discretion and the Sentencing
Process, 17 How. L. REV. 858 (1971); Edmunds, Disparityand DiscretionIn
Sentencing:A ProposalforUniformity, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Edmunds]; Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indeterminate
Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 45 (1977).

54. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
55. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d at 269, states:
IT he peculiar pressures placed upon a defendant threatened with jail
and the stigma of conviction make his willingness to deny the crime an
unpromising test of his prospects for rehabilitation if guilty. It is indeed unlikely that many men who commit serious offenses would balk
on principle from lying in their own defense. The guilty man may quite

sincerely repent his crime but yet, driven by the urge to remain free,
may protest his innocence in a court of law.
56. Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L. J. 204, 216 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Influence
of Defendant's Plea].
57. Id. Also, in addition to suffering legal disabilities, a person convicted of a crime is informally punished by the community at large. For
example, a released convict may have difficulty getting employed. See
PRISON AssocLxTION OF NEW YORK ANN. REPORT 60 (1950).
58. Some judges apparently presume a defendant committed perjury
from the mere fact of conviction. Influence of Defendant's Plea, supra note
56 at 512. Cf"United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d at 1288 (dictum) "[A] verdict
of guilty means only that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
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guilty shows remorse, and thus manifests a positive attitude toward reform. 59 However, a person's ability to reform may not
60
necessarily be shown by his pleading guilty to an offense.
When a judge renders a more severe sentence to a suspected
perjurer than to a defendant pleading guilty to the same offense,
the distinction can only be justified if the perjury indicates a difference in the rehabilitative prospects of the defendants.6 1
In negotiating a plea,6 2 a defendant may admit guilt, not because he refuses to perjure, but because he realizes that his plea
may mitigate his sentence. 6 3 When a defendant avoids perjury
for reasons of expediency and not principle, it is questionable
whether the defendant pleading guilty represents an offender
perjures
with better prospects for rehabilitation than one who
64
himself in an unsuccessful attempt to gain acquittal.
not that the defendant has lied in maintaining his innocence. It is better in
the usual case for the trial judge who suspects perjury to request an investigation." In effect, such a contention violates the defendant's right to plead
not guilty. The accused in a federal case has an absolute constitutional
right to plead not guilty, and if he does elect to go to trial, an absolute statutory right to testify in his own behalf. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976).
59. In a survey judges were questioned as to the effect of a defendant's
guilty plea on his sentence. 87% of the judges stated that a defendant
pleading guilty to a crime was given a more lenient punishment than a defendant who pleaded not guilty. Influence of Defendant's Plea, supra note
56, at 217 n.66. One judge surveyed attempted to justify the discrepancy by
stating: "It must be kept in mind that ordinarily on a plea of guilty, the defendant's case is presented in its most favorable light." Another added:
"When a man pleads guilty, all the details of his crime are rarely presented
to the judge and a moderate, average sentence is imposed." Id. at 218 n.72.
60. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text infra.
61. In a survey, the majority of the judges stated that a defendant who
they believed committed perjury deserved additional punishment. Influence of Defendant's Plea, supra note 56, at 211 n.55.
62. For a history of plea bargaining see Comment, The Plea Bargain in
HistoricalPerspective,23 BUFFALO L. REV.499 (1974). For an analysis of the
effect of plea bargaining on judicial process see generally Kercheral v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). The court noted that a guilty plea
was different in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is a conviction. "Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive.
More is not required, the court has nothing to do but give judgment and
sentence."; Nagel & Neef, The Impact of Plea Bargaining on the Judicial
Process, 62 AB.A.J. 1020 (1976); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1963); Annot., 29
A.L.R.2d 1157 (1953).
Recent cases dealing with the validity of plea bargaining are: United
States v. Cawley, 481 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1973) (plea bargaining is an essential
component of administration of justice and, when properly administered,
should be encouraged); United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.
1972) (plea bargaining is permissible when conducted fairly and when
rights of the accused are fully protected).
63. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration:A Study of Bargain
Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 780 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Newman].
64. This theory is stated in Influence of Defendant's Plea,supra note 56,
at 210.
A reduction in sentence following a guilty plea is consistent with the
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Determinationof Alleged Perjury as a
Violation of Due Process
The Court's application of the theory that a defendant who
commits perjury on the stand demonstrates a greater need for
rehabilitation, also raises a question of denial of procedural due
process. 65 May a defendant's sentence be increased solely because a single judge merely thought that the defendant had not
testified truthfully, 66 without granting the defendant a hearing
to determine if he in fact committed perjury? Grayson con67
tended that the judge could not.

The defendant based his due process argument on the
ground that by permitting a judge to weigh alleged perjury in his
rehabilitation theory of criminal punishment, only if such a plea is indicative of remorse for prior criminal acts. Although a guilty plea may
at times be motivated by repentance, more often it would seem to represent exploitation by the accused of the prosecutor's and court's reaction to such plea. If a defendant who acknowledged his guilt were
aware that the plea could not influence the extent of his punishment,
then perhaps his action might reflect a renunciation of criminal propensities. But, the very fact that a defendant realizes a guilty plea may
mitigate punishment impairs the value of the plea as a gauge of character.
See also Dash, Cracks in the Foundationof CriminalJustice, 46 ILL. L. REV.
385, 395-97 (1951); Newman, supra note 63, at 983-84.
65. The right to "due process of law" is guaranteed by the fifth amendment, which states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in
actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The fourteenth amendment similarly binds the states: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .. " Id. amend. XIV. The "due
process" clause has withstood several interpretations. See Wolf v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (some kind of hearing is required); Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (due process involves "the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind"); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("[t]he
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard"); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870) (right to
notice and hearing).
66. There is no way of knowing how much greater the sentence was that
the judge gave for Grayson's alleged perjury. The only way to know that the
judge did increase the sentence was because he stated so in the record. In
most cases, it is impossible to discern whether a sentencing judge had been
influenced by his belief that the defendant had not testified truthfully, since
there is no requirement that reasons be given. 438 U.S. at 55-56 n.1 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
67. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
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sentencing consideration, such broad discretion might be created, thereby allowing the judge to determine a sentence by impermissible means as well. 68 For example, since a judge is
allowed broad discretion in considering the defendant's alleged
perjury, nothing apart from his personal code of ethics would
restrain him from injecting his personal prejudices into the determination as well.69 Thus, because of the lack of procedural
safeguards, the broad reach of a judge's discretion ought to be
70
strictly limited.
The Court, relying on Williams v. New York, 7 1 established
that due process does not require an adversary presentation to
test the accuracy of information employed in sentencing. 72 The
due process clause need not become "a device for freezing the
68. The Court understood Grayson's argument to be that:
[HIe argues that this Court, in order to preserve due process rights, not
only must prohibit the impermissible sentencing practice of incarcerating for the purpose of saving the Government the burden of bringing a
separate and subsequent perjury prosecution but also must prohibit
the otherwise permissible practice of considering a defendant's untruthfulness for the purpose of illuminating his need for rehabilitation
and society's need for protection. He presents two interrelated reasons.
The effect of both permissible and impermissible sentencing practices
may be the same: additional time in prison. Further, it is virtually impossible, he contends, to identify and establish the impermissible practice.
438 U.S. at 53.
69. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 8.
70. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 53.

71. 337 U.S. 241. Here, a jury convicted the defendant of murder, but
recommended a life sentence. The sentencing judge, partly basing his decision on information not known to the jury but contained in the presentence
report, imposed the death penalty. The defendant argued that this procedure deprived him of his federal constitutional right to confront and crossexamine those supplying information to the probation officer and, through
him, to the sentencing judge. The Court rejected this contention. "And
modern concepts of individualizing punishment have made it all the more
necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information." Id. at 247. "To deprive sentencing judges of this
kind of information would undermine modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful
consideration and experimentation." Id. at 249-50. Therefore, the judge was
held not to have acted unconstitutionally in considering either the defendant's p.,rticipation in criminal conduct for which he had not been convicted
or information found by the probation investigator that the defendant was a
"menace to society." Id. at 244.
72. The Court in Williams, did not concern itself with the issue of the
accuracy of the information in the presentence report. It simply assumed
its accuracy and considered the propriety of its use in a sentencing hearing
without the adversary safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241. Williams held, in short, that "in the
absence of a specific request to do so, due process does not require confrontation and cross-examination of persons who have supplied out-of-court information used in the determination of the sentence." Cohen, supra note
10, at 14.
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evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure." 73 The Court also stated that since a judge requires all the
information he can gather in order to render a rational decision,
it is in both the government's and the defendant's interest to
avoid irrationality.7 4 This interest in rationality outweighs the
defendant's right to due process. 7 5 Furthermore, the Williams
Court relied, in its conclusion, on the integrity of the judges and
their fidelity to their oaths of office to protect against improper
76
use of first hand perjury.
The Grayson dissent argued that the practice supported by
the majority places the defendant at a serious disadvantage.
Other witnesses risk punishment for perjury only on indictment
77
and conviction according to the full protections of due process.
Only the defendant, whose testimony may play a crucial role in
his defense, faces the additional risk that disbelief by a single
78
listener, the judge, will result in additional time in prison.
The majority's reliance on Williams v. New York 79 directly
contradicts its holding in Specht v. Patterson.80 Williams established that due process does not require an adversary presentation to test the accuracy of the information employed in
sentencing.8 1 Specht, however, determined that the denial of a
hearing on a new fact, not an ingredient of the offense charged,
73. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 251.
74. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 53.
75. Id. at 54. See note 63 supra.
76. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55. Dependancy on a judge's
integrity is not always reliable. E.g., FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 18. Judge
Frankel tells of the time when a judge had set a defendant's sentence but
increased it by a substantial amount at the hearing in retaliation of the defendant's labeling the. trial as a "kangaroo court."
77. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 56.
78. Id.
79. 337 U.S. 241.
80. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). In Specht the defendant was convicted of indecent liberties under one Colorado statute that carries a maximum sentence
of 10 years. However, upon the court's post-trial determination, and without
notice and full hearings, the court found that the convicted defendant was
an habitual offender, mentally ill, and was a threat to members of the public. Thus, he was sentenced under anotherstatute which allowed for an indeterminate term from one day to life. The new statute required that a
report of a complete psychiatric examination be sent to the sentencing
judge, but it required no adversary hearing. Id.
The Supreme Court did not extend the Williams theory this far, for the
Colorado statute did not make the commission of a specified crime the basis
for the sentencing. Rather, it made one conviction the basis for commencing another proceeding under another Act to determine whether a person
constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public or is an habitual offender,
and mentally ill. This is a newfinding offact that was not an ingredient of
the offense charged.
81. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250. See note 71 supra.
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violates procedural due process. 8 2 In Specht, a specific isolated
finding of fact was required before the judge could increase the
defendant's sentence. 83 Likewise, the judge in Grayson faced a
single isolated fact not an ingredient of the offense of escape-whether or not the defendant actually committed perjury.

84

Specht indicated that when dealing with isolated factual issues, the requirements of due process overshadowed the needs
of individual sentencing, thereby making procedural safeguards
on that issue required. Williams, on the other hand stated that
due process may not be used "to freeze" the evidence necessary
for sentencing.8 5 The Specht principle, not that of Williams, appears best suited to perjury, in that a defendant need not be
faced with the prospects of increased "rehabilitative" punishment when a separate criminal proceeding is available to determine the fact of perjury.86
The majority failed to consider that perjury, as a sentencing
factor, differs materially from other factors considered by the
sentencing judge. Unlike information of prior criminal activity,87 or information of general character traits, 88 perjury is punishable in a separate criminal proceeding. 89 As a result, the
denial of a defendant's opportunity to defend the allegations of
perjury in trial violates his right to protections under due proc°
ess.
82. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605.
83. Id. See note 80 supra (the fact that defendant was an habitual offender, mentally ill, and was a threat to members of the public were new
findings).
84. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41. See United States v. Espinoza,
481 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1973) ("where a sentencing judge explicitly relies
on certain information in assessing a sentence, fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be given at least some opportunity to rebut that
information").
85. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250.
86. See Carroll, supra note 53. In considering the perjury sentencing
issue, federal appellate courts have failed to extend the Specht principle to
cases of suspected perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233;
United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284; United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d
749.
87. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 244. See note 15 supra.
88. United States v. Carden, 428 F.2d at 1118. See note 15 supra.
89. Perjury statutes do not exclude a defendant's perjury on his own
behalf. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951) (no violation
to double jeopardy limitations to prosecute a defendant for perjury committed on his own behalf); 18 U.S.C. 1621 (1976). Defendants are, however,

rarely prosecuted for the commission of perjury at a trial conviction. The
more common case occurs when a defendant is acquitted in a criminal action and later prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Slutzsky, 79 F.2d 504
(3rd Cir. 1935).
90. See notes 65 &87 supra.
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A defendant will not always be entitled to a separate jury
trial on the question of perjury, because lying under oath in a
judicial proceeding may sometimes be punishable as contempt.9 1 Criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the
the contempt ocjudge certifies that the conduct constituting
92
curred in the presence of the court.
For perjury to qualify as contempt, it must act as an "obstruction of the administration of justice. '93 By virtue of the
Supreme Court holding that perjury by itself does not "obstruct
the administration of justice, '94 perjury must qualify as contempt in order to punish the defendant without a trial. 95 Therefore, when a judge augments the sentence of a convicted
defendant, as a penalty for perjury which cannot qualify as contempt, he accomplishes indirectly what he is prohibited to do
directly.96 The majority's approval of this practice in Grayson
facilitates such occurrences. Moreover, if the lengthened sentence for an alleged perjury falls within the statutory limits of
the sentence it is not usually subject to review. 97 On the other
hand, if the defendant is cited for contempt, he retains a right of
appeal. 98
When the responsibility for sentencing is placed solely
within the discretionary power of the judge, the possibility exists that the judge's decision may prove erroneous. 99 The judge
91. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides in part:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion such contempt of its authority and

none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice...
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a), 18 U.S.C.A. provides:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order
of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and
entered of record.
93. See note 91 supra.
94. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) (a witness may not be punished for
contempt for perjury alone); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919) (a district court has no power to adjudge a witness guilty of contempt solely because in the court's opinion he is wilfully refusing to testify truthfully).
95. See note 91 supra.
96. Influence of Defendant's Plea, supra note 56, at 214.
97. See notes 103-5 and accompanying text infra.
98. An order adjudging a defendant guilty of criminal contempt is appealable. In re Merchant Stock and Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639, 642 (1912); See
Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958).
99. See, e.g., Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d at 939 (court emphasizes
that judges must realize they are not infallible). In United States v. Moore,
484 F.2d at 1258 (Craven, J., concurring), Judge Craven concurred with the
decision, but only because of past precedent. He stated, among other
things, that the trial judge should never impose additional punishment be-
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is given few guidelines, 10 0 and additionally the attempt to appraise character is, in the Court's own words, a parlous endeavor "not necessarily an enterprise for which judges are
notably equipped by prior training." 10 1 If the defendant alleges
judicial error in pre-trial and trial proceedings, he is protected
from abuse by appellate review of those errors. 10 2 In sentencing, however, unless the judge states his reasons in the record,
as the judge in Grayson did, 10 3 or if the punishment imposed
exceeds statutory limits, 10 4 the likelihood of appellate review is
minimal. 10 5 Without appellate review of judicial error in sencause of his belief that defendant lied in his own defense, because, as juries
are sometimes wrong, so may be the judge.
100. See note 15 supra (guidelines resulting from case law).
101. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 51, quoting United States v.
Hendrix, 505 F.2d at 1236.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) provides for federal jurisdiction of review.
The Supreme Court or any other court of Appellate jurisdiction may
affirm, modify, vacate, set aside, or reverse any judgment, decree or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the
case and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceeding to be had as may be just under
the circumstances.
103. See note 27 supra.
104. E.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (the wide discretion
of the sentencing judge and the factors he may consider lead to the general
proposition that sentences within statutory limits are normally unreviewable); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930) ("[the rule
that appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits provided by statute is firmly established").
105. Most appellate reversals of improperly imposed sentences have
arisen in the unusual case where the judge improvidently made an explanation. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (the judge's decision was based on grounds which were later determined unconstitutional);
United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1061 (1972) (a judge's sentence was overruled when he cited facts
about the defendant that were untrue). Thus, the judge is put in an uncomfortable situation. He can be silent, or risk reversal by stating his means of
determination. See United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1, 3-4 (6th Cir. 1975)
where it states:
We freely recognize, as no doubt did the trial judge, that had he not
stated his views on the record here, the subjective process by which he
reached his sentencing decision would not be exposed, and there would
probably be no remand. If preventing possible remand or reversal is to
be the sole objective of his endeavors, therefore, the seasoned trial
judge would want carefully to weigh his words so as to avoid the increased risk which sometimes comes from expressing himself too
openly and honestly on a given situation. It is difficult to urge that trial
courts express themselves freely upon the record when it can be shown
that, in so doing, they subject themselves to greater risk of reversal on
remand.
See also, Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 960 (1969) ("[ilf the trial judge makes no mention of his thoughts
on [defendant's perjury] any sentence within legal limits will stand"). Cf.,
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HAav. L. REV.
1281, 1293 n.63 (1952) (trial judge's sentencing is in effect reviewable by pardoning and commutation authorities).
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tencing, it is illogical to allow the judge greater discretionary
power which may lead to an increased margin of error. It is necessary to remember that ninety percent of offenders simply
plead guilty; 10 6 thus, most defendants have contact with the
criminal judicial system only in the sentencing process. It is
clearly inequitable to allow review of alleged error for only the
ten percent that traverse the gamut of trial, and then only in the
pretrial and trial stages.
Determinationof Alleged Perjury Acting as a "ChillingEffect"
When a person is punished for the alleged commission of
perjury without indictment or hearings, he has lost his procedural due process rights. This loss precipitates another invasion
into the defendant's rights, that of his right to testify on his own
behalf. Both federal statute and the sixth amendment guarantee this right. 10 7 The issue, however, that remains is whether
the discretionary augmentation of sentences based on alleged
perjury "chills" the defendant's right to testify.10 8
The majority in Grayson passed over this issue by stating
simply that its decision does not infringe on the defendant's
right to testify in his own behalf, for this right is limited to testimony in accordance with the oath. 10 9 Any "chilling effect," reasons the Court, is permissible because it simply inhibits the
defendant from taking the stand to testify falsely. 1 0 Neither
statute,"' nor the Constitution 1 2 grants the right to lie. On the
contrary, perjury statutes punish those who give false testi3
mony."
The dissent rejected the narrow statement that a "chilling
effect" is acceptable because it simply hinders one from testifying falsely. 1 14 The dissent argued that procedural due process is
106. See note 1 supra.
107. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 18
U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) states:
Competency of accused
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against

the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of

inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person
charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. Hisfailure to
make such a request shall not create any presumption against him.
(emphasis added).

108. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
109. Id. at 54.
110. Id.
111. See note 89 supra.
112. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.

113. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54.
114. Id. at 55.
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infringed because the defendant's failure to convince, not only
the jury of his innocence, but also the judge, may thereby result
in additional time in prison. 1 15 In order to fully preserve a defendant's due process rights, the judge's broad power to augment one's sentence for statements he believes to be perjured
must yield to the defendant's free choice to testify on his own
behalf.
The Grayson majority places the defendant in a new dilemma. His credibility is placed into question from the moment
he begins to speak, and if he fails to convince the jury of his
innocence, he is punished. After Grayson, in order to avoid further punishment, the defendant must also convince the judge
that he has not perjured himself.' 6 Because of this new burden
the defendant may decide not to testify. However, this course of
action may also work against the defendant. Despite the standard instruction given to the jury that they should not draw any
adverse inference from the defendant's failure to testify, "a defendant who does not take the stand will probably prejudice his
' 17
chance of acquittal." "
By its decision, the Grayson majority placed a judge's sole
determination of alleged perjury on the same level as material
facts disclosed to the judge in the presentence report. In doing
so, the Court failed to recognize a basic distinction between the
two types of information. Of all the information presented to a
sentencing judge, only alleged perjury results directly from
courtroom pressures and leaves no legal recourse for a defendant wrongly accused of perjury. 118 For example, unlike alleged
perjury, prior crimes committed by the defendant for which he
has not been convicted, gives the judge an indication of the defendant's character, yet, has no "chilling effect." This is because
information on prior crimes does not result from trial pressures,
and error in the use of such information is subject to review." 9
Similarly, consideration of other crimes has no "chilling effect" on a defendant's decision to testify because, despite what
is said or done in court, the defendant's criminal record remains
unchanged and accessible to the judge. 120 Thus, unlike the use
of alleged perjury, the presentence report's full character ap115. Id. at 56.
116. Carroll, supra note 54, at 683. See also note 87 supra.
117. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 58. n.5.
118. Absent direct appeal of alleged error in sentencing by the judge, see
notes 147-51 infra, and absent the acceptance of the argument that alleged
perjury is a separate finding of fact that requires hearing, see notes 79-86
and accompanying text supra, there is no adequate legal recourse.
119. Carroll, supra note 53, at 689-90.
120. Id.
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praisal is a more accurate and acceptable means with which to
evaluate a defendant and determine a sentence. The
presentence evaluation does not arise from courtroom pressures, nor do its conclusions affect the defendant's decision
whether to testify. In view of these basic differences, the
Grayson majority should have placed the use of the defendant's
alleged perjury, as an informational factor, in a category of its
121
own governed by stricter procedural rules.
The "chilling effect" that results from a judge's unchecked
determination of perjury, not only inhibits the defendant's right
to testify, but also his right to testify truthfully. For example, a
defendant whose defense is unusual, may feel that he will be
unable to adequately explain certain facts to the satisfaction of
the jury or the court. If this is the case, he may fear that the trial
judge will disbelieve his testimony and therefore impose a heavier sentence than he would have otherwise received if convicted.
As a result, the defendant may feel safer not giving any truthful
122
testimony, lest it be misconstrued, and thus not testify at all.
The Court considered this argument "frivolous."' 123 The
Grayson decision, reasoned the Court, does not require judges
to enhance sentences of all defendants whose testimony is
deemed false. Rather, the decision simply gives the judge the
right to carefully evaluate a defendant's testimony in order to
determine whether it contains willful and material falsehoods. 124 If so, in light of all the other knowledge gained about
the defendant, the judge must assess the meaning of that conduct with respect to prospects of the defendant's rehabilitation
and restoration to a useful place in society. 125 "Awareness of
such a process realistically cannot be deemed to affect the decision of an accused but unconvicted defendant to testify truth126
fully in his own behalf."'
121. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d at 1236, where the court
recognized that the accused defendant may be unduly refrained from testifying because of fear that the jury's or judge's disbelief would automatically

lead to an increased sentence. Stating that it was unrealistic to make a flat
rule that perjury at the trial must never be considered, it stated two guiding
concepts. First, judges should not consider the defendant who took the
stand as an ipsofacto perjurer. Second, perjury should not be treated as an
adverse sentencing factor unless the judge is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed it.
122. Forcing the defendant to make such a choice directly violates his
statutory and Constitutional right to testify. See note 107 supra.
123. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
124. Id.
125. Id. A stronger position as to the judge's power in using alleged perjury is found in United States v. Wallace, 418 F.2d at 878. There the court
states that an "inescapable" demonstration of the defendant's perjury is a
factor the judge may be "censored" in ignoring. Id.

126. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
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The Grayson dissent, however, rejected the majority's reasoning and questioned the wisdom of not placing safeguards on
the judge's exercise of his discretion. Safeguards would be warranted in order to minimize the defendant's fear that his truthful testimony would be perceived as false. 127 "[WIithout such
safeguards, [the dissent fails] to see how the Court can dismiss
as 'frivolous' the argument that this sentencing practice will in1 28
hibit the right to testify truthfully.'
The Grayson Court avoids the responsibility of placing
guidelines on the judge's discretionary power, and thus sidesteps defining the limitations on its use. The Court states that
its decision is not a mandate, but merely a recognition of a tool
provided for a sentencing judge. 129 This "tool," however, need
not be a mandate in order to inhibit the defendant's desire to
assert his right to testify. Once the judiciary receives broad
130
powers it may feel bound to use them.
A recent example of the wide effect of the Grayson Court's
"tool" appeared in United States v. Santiago.131 Unlike his codefendants, Santiago exercised his fifth amendment right and refused to testify. 132 The district court judge, believing that the
evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, took a harsh
view of defendant's continual denial of guilt. 133 When Santiago
127. Id. at 57. See note 121 supra.
128. 438 U.S. at 57. See United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d at 1288 (Craven,
J., concurring) ("[tIruth is, indeed, stranger than fiction, and every one of
us know of at least one cock-and-bull story, believed by no one, that turned
out to be true").
129. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
130. A federal judge indicated that he would not have sentenced a particular defendant to jail if he had been guided only by the probation report.
However, the judge felt required to consider information he had learned
while presiding over this trial, related trials and sentencings, although the
defendant had not had an opportunity to challenge the damaging information. The National Law Journal, Nov. 27, 1978, at 35, col. 4.
131. 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978). In Santiago, defendants attempted to
sell heroin to an agent buyer. Santiago remained in the car while the others
were in the street concluding the transaction. Once agreement of sale was
made, a co-defendant went to Santiago and returned with the heroin. The
defendants were indicted for intentional distribution of heroin in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 84 (a) (1) (1976). Defendant Santiago was tried and convicted
in a jury trial. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that to him it was
clear from the evidence that Santiago, who had had more narcotics experience than his associates, sought to insulate himself from the risk, but not
from the money.
132. 582 F.2d at 1136.
133. The district court judge stated at the sentencing hearing: "The defendant
the transaction. There is no question in
my mindSantiago
about it.was
He involved
continuesin to
deny his guilt, which is another strike
against him, as far as I am concerned." Id. After hearing this statement,
Santiago's counsel told the court: "That is on advice of counsel." Id. However, the judge answered:

19791

Judicial Discretion

received a harsher sentence than his codefendants he appealed,
punished for exercisclaiming that he had been inappropriately
34
ing his fifth amendment rights.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction because the de135
fendant did not clearly show abuse by the judge of his powers.
The Santiago court used Grayson to support the belief of the
necessity for a judge's broad power in sentencing 3 6 The vagueness of the power granted to a sentencing judge, by Grayson,
places a heavier burden on the defendant who attempts to show
clear abuse of judicial discretion. The undefined extent of the
judge's discretionary power makes it more difficult for a defendant to define and prove its abuse.
As a result, Grayson may not only be used as a "tool" for
augmenting punishment due to alleged perjury on the stand; it
may also be interpreted as giving the judge broader power over
various aspects of trial. This may include, as in Santiago, a possible restraint on the defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right.
As a result, the defendant is placed in a "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" dilemma. If he chooses to testify, he runs
the risk of augmented sentence based on the judge's belief that
the defendant perjured himself. Upon exercise of the constitutional right not to testify, again the judge may impose an increased sentence based on his belief that the defendant is in
effect lying by not testifying. The Grayson decision, which
Well, telling lies on the advice of counsel does not win any points in my

courtroom, and that is what he is still doing. At least he had the good
sense not to take the stand and commit perjury during the trial,because
had he done that, the sentence would be far more severe than it is going
to be.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1137. The appellate court states that the trial court's exercise
of its broad discretion can not be disturbed by review unless there is a plain
showing of abuse of power by the trial court. Id. See also, United States v.
Cardi, 519 F.2d 309. Also, a showing of abuse is not shown by the mere fact
that defendant received a harsher sentence after trial than his co-defendants who pleaded guilty. 582 F.2d at 1137. See Simpson v. United States, 342
F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1965) (court will not vacate a sentence of the appellant
which was greater than that given to the pleading co-defendants, especially
where record shows sentence imposed in a thoughtful and discriminating
way).
136. Recognizing that the district judge had stated his reasoning for sentencing in the records, this showed sufficient consideration. United States
v. Santiago, 582 F.2d at 1137. In addition, although the court states its decision is not to be used as condoning a sentencing court's consideration of the
failure of a defendant to admit guilt as an adverse consideration in sentencing, it did, through a footnote, support this example of a judge's wide discretion by citing to the powers granted to the judge in Grayson. Id. at 1138.
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places such a restraint on the defendant's exercise of his rights,
cannot be justified.
CONCLUSION

For effective individual sentencing, a judge should consider
as much information as possible which reflects the defendant's
character. Differing conclusions as to what adequately reflects
character have led to a wide discrepancy in the degree of punishment given to offenders who were punished for the same
crime, but sentenced by different judges. 137 Rehabilitation is
the main goal of indeterminate sentencing. 138 However, if an offender feels that he has been wronged by a sentence predicated
on disparate sentencing practices, or if the punishment seems
clearly disproportionate to the crime or sentencing norm, he is
1 39
likely to be a poor candidate for rehabilitation.
137. Judge Frankel stated during a Senate Committee hearing on penal
reform:
I have sentenced more people than I find it comfortable to count. I am
certainly not happy, that some of the sentences were too harsh. Some
no doubt, were excessively lenient, and I regret those too, but frankly,
not as much. Always there has been a disquieting awareness of having
too much power, too little knowledge, and next to nothing in the way of
guidance from Congress, from higher courts, or from any other quarter.
I have known vividly that I am responsible, with all my colleagues, for
creating the crazy-quilt of sentencing disparities that is probably the
most awful aspect of sentencing.
SENATE COMM. ON PENAL REFORM, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON § 1437
(Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as REFORM].
One writer recommends that bank robbers might consider New York
but stay away from South Carolina. Bank robbery in New York's Southern
Judicial District carries an average sentence of seven years in prison. In
South Carolina, however, the average run eighteen years. These disparities
existed even though the felons were convicted in federal courts of committing the same federal offense. CONG. Q., July 15, 1978, at 1807 [hereinafter
cited as QUARTERLY].
For further examples of existing unjustified disparity in sentences, see
DAvIs, supra note 6, at 133; Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize Unjusitified Disparityin FederalCriminal Sentences?, 42 F.R.D. 218, 220 (1967);
Kennedy, Justice is Found in the Hearts and Minds of Free Men, 30 F.R.D.
401, 424-25 (1961); Rubin, Disparityand Equality of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 55,
56 (1967).
The disparities are not limited to time served, but are also found in the
federal laws. Robbery of a federally insured bank carries a maximum term
of 20 years in jail. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1977). However, robbery of a federal
enclave carries only 15 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1977).
138. See notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra.
139. See, e.g., Shephard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958),
where Judge Stewart remarked:
Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal its surest
measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives. Whether a
sentence is fair cannot, of course, be gauged simply by comparing it
with the punishment imposed upon others for similar offenses. But
that test, though imperfect, is hardly irrelevant.
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The Grayson decision is significant in that it approves of the
use of information concerning the defendant obtained via a
judge's broad discretionary power in sentencing, even though
that power is based on a questionable theory of relevancy of the
information. 4° This judicial power takes on a greater significance than the value of the defendant's constitutional right of
"due process,"1 41 and freedom from procedural "chilling ef' 142
fects.
The fault of the Grayson Court lies, not in its approval of
broad judicial discretionary power in sentencing, but in its failure to realize the grave dangers inherent in such a concept, and
as a result, its failure to place guidelines on the judge's discre1 43
tion. The Court could have followed United States v. Hendrix,
which it cited as support. Hendrix established minimal guidelines 144 for judicial consideration of perjury allegedly committed
at the trial, whereas Grayson did not. Thus, as long as a sentencing judge remains within the prescribed statutory limits for
a particular offense, and does not specify on record what led him
whatever criteria he
to his exact determination, he is free to use 45
sentence.
a
determine
to
deems necessary
Chief Justice Burger recently stated, "[perhaps the real
evil underlying our penal system is not its concepts, whether rehabilitation or vengeance or something else, but the lack of any
agreed concept, the absence of plan and purpose, and worst of
all-the indifference that underlies the neglect."' 146 The
Grayson decision, written by Chief Justice Burger, aggravated
this neglect.
The Need for Standards
Rather than neglecting the problem, what must be sought is
a sentencing system that is a compromise between the "unacceptable" regime of unfettered judicial discretion, and the oppo140. See notes 41-64 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 65-100 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 101-23 and accompanying text supra.
143. 505 F.2d 1233. See note 21 supra.
144. For a discussion of the guildelines presented by the Hendrix court,
see note 121 supra.
145. See notes 135-37 supra.
146. Burger, No Man Is an Island, 56 A.B.A.J. 325, 326 (1970). But see the
report of Chief Justice Burger from the bench in the argument of Maxwell v.
Bishop, 393 U.S. 997 (1968). "The Chief Justice also regarded it as a 'large
question' whether any standards at all are really desirable, and suggested
that if the Court did require states to impose sentence standards, every
man condemned thereunder would challenge them in the U.S. Supreme
Court as inadequate." 7 CRn. L. REP. 1025 (1970).
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site extreme of rigid, mandatory sentences. 14 7 The
establishment of such a system would be based on two premises. First, the sentencing judge would need specific guidelines;
a system to obtain knowledgeable advice in order to promote ordered discretion. 148 Absent legislation, the Court could indirectly accomplish this end by requiring sentencing judges to
149
articulate reasons for increasing sentences on the record.
This practice could develop into a limited body of jurisprudence
on sentencing standards. 150 In North Carolina v. Pearce,'151 the
Court, by implication, recognized that sentencing decisions can
be rationally justified and facts on which sentencing decisions
are based can be specified on the record. 152 As a result, judges
147. REFORM, supra note 137, at 8878.
148. On January 30, 1978, the Senate overwhelmingly approved the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978. Part of the reform, § 1437, would be the first
stating specific objectives, policies, and guidelines for federal judges to follow in meting out sentences. The provisions of this statute create a new
agency to determine sentences, and drastically revise the role presently
played by judges.
The agency created is labeled the "Sentencing Commission." This
seven-member agency would become a permanent part of the judicial
branch. The members would be appointed by the President, three of them
from names submitted by the Judicial Conference.
The responsibility of this commission is to collect information on current sentencing practices throughout the country and establish guideline
sentencing ranges within each statutory category. In most cases, judges
would be required to follow these guidelines. For each federal offense,
these guidelines would specify a series of sentencing ranges based on the
circumstances of the crime and certain general defendant characteristics.
Even though a judge would be allowed to hand down a sentence above
or below the guideline range, he would have to state reasons for going
outside the guidelines, and their sentences could be appealed by the defendant or the government. QUARTERLY, supra note 136, at 1808.
"An articulation of reasons may actually contribute to the offender's rehabilitation by avoiding any feeling that his sentence was arbitrary." Dorsynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 456 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Some states are resorting to a determinate sentencing system for specific felonies. Aspen, New Class X Sentencing Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL. B.
J. 344 (1978); Casson & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California:The
New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5 (1978).
149. United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233. See note 121 supra.

150. See ABA

STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY,

1 (Approved Draft 1968);

(1967) at 145-46; Pugh & Carver, supra note 10, at 43. Connecticut has a system of written decisions handed down regarding sentences and appellate
review of these sentences. However, standards have not been developed as
expeditiously as was hoped. For an analysis of Connecticut's experience in
this area, see Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions:
A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960).
151. 395 U.S. 711.
152. Id. This case may be of considerable importance with regard to the
development of sentencing standards by appellate courts. The controversy
concerned the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment and held
that a defendant who succeeds in overturning a conviction and is subse-
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finding themselves in a similar situation could refer to specific
reasons for determination, using such reasoning as a guideline
in their own determinations.
Second, in formulating a sentencing system, a method for
appealing sentences need be developed. Appellate review could
be another means of conforming punishment of the defendant to
153
that received by other offenders who commit the same crime.
The Court began a move in this direction in its decision in Townsend v. Burke. 154 There the Court allowed review of the process
of sentencing, but generally did not allow review of the severity
of sentences. Thus, Townsend established judicial recognition
of the need, and the legality of appellate review of sentencing.
The Grayson Court could have continued the Townsend trend
and validly increased its review power over the severity of
sentences as well. However, despite Townsend and relentless
quently reconvicted, must be given credit for the time served under the first
conviction. In order to prevent the judge from attempting to punish the defendant for seeking to overturn the original conviction on appeal, the Court
decided that the trial judge could not impose an increased sentence after
his reconviction unless the reasons affirmatively appeared.
[The] reasons must be based upon objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon
which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence
may be fully reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 726.
153. See note 136 supra.
154. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). In Townsend, defendant and others were arrested and indicted for burglary and armed robbery in a Pennsylvania state
court. All defendants pled guilty.
Defendant Townsend was given a sentence that was within the statutory limit. Townsend appealed, alleging violation of his constitutional rights
in that, except for a 10 minute conversation with his wife, he was held incommunicado for a period of 40 hours between his arrest and his plea of
guilty. Also, defendant pointed out that he was given no counsel.
The Supreme Court found that at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge had relied on several assumptions concerning Townsend's criminal record which were found to be materially false. The Court reversed the
sentence, not because of the lack of counsel, nor because of the severity of
the sentence. The Court recognized that if a sentence is within statutory
limits, its severity ordinarily would not be grounds for review. Stated the
Court:
It is not the duration or severity of this sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the carelessness of designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false,
which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services
which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in
due process.
Id. at 741. Thus, although the Court reversed mainly on procedural
grounds, it did recognize that the severity of sentence may sometimes be
the basis of review by the appellate courts. See generally Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736. For a discussion of this case see Comment, Due Process
and Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 PA. L. REV. 257, 265 (1952).
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15 5
criticism aimed at the lack of appellate review of sentencing,
the Grayson Court avoided the issue and left the road open for a
totally discretionary indeterminate sentencing process.
As a result of United States v. Grayson,156 it appears that
the Court would prefer to have another branch of government
correct the problems that the Court's decisions helped to create.
Fortunately, Congress has begun legislation with an aim toward
penal reform, 157 emphasizing the use of guidelines 158 and appellate review.15 9 The Grayson Court could have lessened the immediate need for reform. Rather, Grayson emphasized it.

JonathanD. Savage

155. See, e.g., Burr, Appellate Review as a Means of ControllingCriminal
Sentencing Discretion:A Workable Alternative, 33 U. Pir. L. REV. 1 (1971);
Cobwin, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 207 (1971); Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on
Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 521 (1937); Subeloff, The Sentence of the Court:
Should There Be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A. J. 13 (1955); Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 1357.
156. 438 U.S. 41.
157. See note 148 supra.
158. Id.
159. See notes 148, 150 supra.

